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Introduction:
Unwritten Constitution, Invisible Government
Anthony Chase*
What surprised everybody, including Mao Zedong, was
that none of the conspirators attempted suicide. Instead,
in the limited time available before being arrested they
tried to destroy as much incriminating evidence as
possible.
YAO MING-LE, THE CONSPIRACY AND
MURDER OF MAO'S HEIR 179 (1983)
Even the history of science, as philosopher Georges Canguilhem
observes, is not itself a science.' Thus, it comes as no surprise that the
history of law, and its construction in both academic and popular literature,
should be denied characterization as a form of science or scientific activity.
Nevertheless, legal history and theory, sometimes labeled Jurisprudence in
law school seminars, a discipline even Langdell was not always prepared to
denominate the science of law,2 can be said to achieve discoveries or
breakthroughs. Whether one follows Bachelard and Canguilhem or, on this
side of the Atlantic, Thomas Kuhn, some notion of epistemological break,
of a sharp separation from previous theory, is essential in order to describe
those moments in the history of theory when radical reformulation actually
becomes a possibility.'
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center.
I. GEORGES CANGUILHEM, A VITAL RATIONALIST: SELECTED WRITINGS FROM GEORGES
CANGUILHEM :52 (Francois Delaporte ed. & Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1994).
2. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE LAW SCHOOL,
FIFTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF HARVARD COLLEGE 1876-1877
(1878).
Law has not the demonstrative certainty of mathematics; nor does one's
knowledge of it admit of many simple and easy tests, as in [the] case of a dead
or foreign language; nor does it acknowledge truth as its ultimate test and stan-
dard, like natural science; nor is our law embodied in a written text, which is to
be studied and expounded, as is the case with the Roman law and with some
foreign systems.
Id. at 96-97.
3. CANGUILHEM, supra note I, at 31-35; PARADIGMS AND REVOLUTIONS: APPRAISALS
& APPLICATIONS OF THOMAS KUHN'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, (Gary Gutting ed., 1980).
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Two such instances can be cited from the development of twentieth-
century jurisprudence: The first discovery was that of the unwritten
constitution, the second was of invisible government. Each of these break-
throughs represented the potential, at least, for a dramatic rewriting of
contemporary legal theory. During a critical juncture in twentieth-century
United States political history, the first discovery produced such a change.
The second, not yet made general to the field of legal thought in the United
States, at least could become a common assumption of ongoing legal
studies, indeed of popular legal consciousness as a whole. Whether it will
depends largely on the same kind of historical and political factors which
not only shaped the reception of legal realism and its systematic exposure
of the unwritten constitution but, necessarily, grounds the success or failure
of any theoretical innovation in philosophy or natural science.
The social context within which the discovery of the unwritten
constitution took place should by now be familiar. The liberal capitalist
road to modernization (represented by Britain, France, and the United
States) had increasingly come into conflict with the authoritarian capitalist
model (Germany and Japan), as sociologist Barrington Moore describes in
his classic study of the social origins of dictatorship and democracy.4
When President Franklin Roosevelt assumed office in 1933, he confronted
a situation where, according to world-systems theorist Immanuel Wallerstein,
the liberal capitalist approach was challenged sharply from the right by
Germany and, equally disconcerting to those whose task it was to manage
the state apparatus, from the left by the Soviet Union. Both the New Deal
program engineered by Roosevelt and the Nazi program led by Hitler were
carried out within the confines of a capitalist political economy. But the
rise of the Nazis in Germany (and, to be sure, emperor-system fascism in
Japan) facilitated, as Wallerstein observes, Roosevelt's development of "the
New Deal as an alternative type of political solution," one that was liberal
rather than authoritarian in Moore's terminology, "centrist" rather than
"rightist" in Wallerstein's.' Once the international right wing, the Axis
powers, had been defeated (and the Red Army was in Berlin), the United
States shifted from a left of center strategy (aimed at defeating authoritarian
forms of capitalist rule) to a right of center strategy, becoming as Wal-
lerstein puts it, "the leader of a 'free world' alliance against the world left
4. BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY:
LORD AND PEASANT IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD (1966).
5. IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, The USA in the World Today, in THE POLITICS OF THE
WORLD-ECONOMY 69, 70 (1984).
1704 Vol. 18
2
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 2
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss3/2
Chase
... " This volte-face in United States policy (identified as a postwar
response to communist expansion by some historians but as already taking
place early in the war by critics like Gabriel Kolko) 7 provides an essential
historical boundary alongside of which to locate legal realism's rise and
relative decline.
Thus, diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union by the Roosevelt
administration and equally unprecedented unemployment figures claimed
center stage at the same time that Karl Llewellyn, at the political margin
represented by professional culture, published his realist manifesto on the
Constitution. "I am not arguing," he declared,
that the United States ought to have the sort of constitution loosely
designated as "unwritten." I am arguing that they have such a constitu-
tion, and that nobody can stop their having such a constitution, and that
whether anyone likes that fact or not, the fact has been there for
decades, and must be dealt with by any theory that purports to do a
theory's work.'
What troubled Llewellyn, of course, and other realists at that moment was
the Supreme Court's obstruction of the New Deal; specifically, the
roadblocks in the path of liberal capitalism's reconstruction (under new and
transparently dangerous circumstances) thrown up by a judiciary clinging to
the conservative apologetics of substantive economic due process. If the
Court ruled that laissez-faire had been written into the Constitution, the
realists, echoing Holmes' famous Lochner dissent,9replied that the con-
stitution to which the Court should turn was, in fact, essentially unwritten
and therefore no economic philosophy could be designated as permanent,
unalterable, fixed.'0  The Constitution itself, following Llewellyn's
6. Id. at 71.
7. See GABRIEL KOLKO, THE POLITICS OF WAR: THE WORLD AND UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY 1943-1945 (1968); JOYCE AND GABRIEL KOLKO, THE LIMITS OF POWER:
THE WORLD AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-1954 (1972).
8. Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 n.5
(1934).
9. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see HAROLD
J. LASKI, The Political Philosophy of Mr. Justice Holmes, in STUDIES IN LAW AND POLITICS
146 (Archon Books 1969) (1932); HAROLD J. LASKI, THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: A
COMMENTARY AND AN INTERPRETATION (1948).
10. See Robert W. Gordon, The Elusive Transformation, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 137
(1994):
The specific Realist project [Morton Horwitz] most admires, as I do, was the
work demolishing the Classical categories, breaking the link between rights and
19941 1705
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paradigm, was a kind of artifact, a reflection of social and historical
circumstances, something put to use for particular purposes by a specific
society at a given point in time. And if ever there was a context which
cried out for a new constitutional verdict, it was the suddenly worldwide
economic depression.
The cumulative weight of social and political events-from the
instability in government precipitated by spectacular economic dislocation
to the alarming cartelization of world markets, from the reelection of
Roosevelt in 1936 to his bold, court-packing maneuver--effectively pro-
duced capitulation by the Supreme Court. Michael Ariens has recently
described how, initially, it was taken for granted that politics, not some
autonomous unfolding of constitutional principle, had caused the judiciary
to change its tune. This theoretical reformulation of constitutional doctrine
starkly revealed by the notorious "switch in time that saved the nine" was
uniformly regarded as an adjustment by the Court, in the nick of time as far
as most observers were concerned, to social and economic facts which were
simultaneously new and inescapable." An epistemological break within
the history of American legal and constitutional theory was thus provoked,
ultimately, by an evolution in forces and relations of production and by that
transformation's necessary political corollary.
The focus of Ariens' essay is on the way in which the theoretical
understanding of what had happened during the constitutional crisis of 1937
was subsequently revised to fit new social needs. The breakthrough of
realism was thus remanded, using a lawyer's term, for further review in the
light of cold war exigencies. Just as the left of center strategy described by
Wallerstein was, in the postwar period, converted to one right of center, and
just as the United States abroad pursued what in Japan was actually called
"the reverse course,"' 2 by the 1950s, American legal culture was also being
reoriented by key figures such as Felix Frankfurter who knew precisely what
remedies, disintegrating the concept of property, trashing the public-private
distinction and the presumptions that state action was normally 'coercive' and
market relations normally 'free,' and above all, recognizing that the capitalist
economy has a socially contingent constitution that is neither natural nor
necessary, but alterable by deliberate collective action ('policy choices').
Id. at 159-60.
II. Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, Or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REv. 620,
622-23, 631-33 (1994).
12. MICHAEL SCHALLER, THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF JAPAN: THE ORIGINS OF THE
COLD WAR IN ASIA 122 (1985); see THEODORE COHEN, REMAKING JAPAN: THE AMERICAN
OCCUPATION AS NEW DEAL (1987); J.W. DOWER, EMPIRE AND AFTERMATH: YOSHIDA
SHIGERU AND THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE, 1878-1954 (1988).
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they were doing. "What is most important," concludes Ariens regarding
Frankfurter's turnabout, is that "his revised history of the constitutional
crisis of 1937 became the accepted history in legal academia. This new
version allowed legal academics to conclude that the decisions of Justice
Roberts in the spring of 1937 were the product of legal reflection, not
political pressure.I3 Not for nothing does Canguilhem emphasize the
social origins of knowledge.
Given this background, it becomes easier to understand why the second
critical discovery of modern jurisprudence, that of invisible government, has
managed to make so little headway when it comes to redrawing the road
map of even academia's conception of legal reality. Just as historical events
conspired to bring forward and then rudely cast aside the progressive legal
realism of the 1930s, the late twentieth-century critique of invisible
government has been pressed forward by a quite contradictory ensemble of
historical circumstances, only the outline of which can presently be
identified. This special issue of the Nova Law Review contributes to an
urgent charting of that outline as its definition takes form against the
horizon of contemporary legal theory.
Before proceeding to this second dramatic innovation within modern
jurisprudence, however, we must be sure to understand what legal realism
did and did not represent. Certainly it challenged those legal notions which
placed law in a privileged position above, or at least outside, the realm of
politics. Just as Llewellyn had relied upon Bryce, Beard, and Bentley, the
last of whom "saw and said in 1908 all that should have been necessary to
force constitutional law theory into total reconstruction,"' 4 another writer
whose work appeared in the United States in 1908, upon whom Llewellyn
apparently did not rely but certainly could have, made transparent the extent
to which legal theory had been seeking a new paradigm for decades. Italian
political philosopher Antonio Labriola observed that "legislating has become
an epidemic; and reason enthroned in legal ideology has been dethroned by
parliaments .... [N]ew legislation has more than once been revised, and
the strangest oscillations may be observed in it . . . .
During the momentous transition from a mercantilist to a capitalist
political economy in the United States, 6 the legal system and its rules had
13. Ariens, supra note 11, at 652.
14. Llewellyn, supra note 8, at 1.
15. ANTONIO LABRIOLA, ESSAYS ON THE MATERIALISTIC CONCEPTION OF HISTORY 198-
99 (1908).
16. See WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS, THE CONTOURS OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1961);
MAURICE DOBB, STUDIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM (1947); Mitchell Franklin,
1994] 1707
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been turned inside out. By the end of the nineteenth-century, it was evident
that the notion of law as immutable, "reason enthroned," was no longer
acceptable even to those in power. Why, then, should it be passively
accepted by those seeking admission to the circle of citizenship, access to
power itself? Although the realists, as a result of their challenge to con-
ventional legal ideology ("a government of laws and not of men," in the
popular reference) were sometimes accused of moral relativism or of
harboring anti-democratic sensibilities, the charge was groundless. The
crucial point to make was that constitutional democracy had never been
secured in the first place merely through deployment of the myth of legal
certainty, the idea that legal rules could somehow be made impervious to
manipulation by power. The real constitution, the real guarantee of
democracy was something that could not be protected by language standing
alone, no matter how sacred, even if memorized by every elementary school
student and recited, hand on heart, by each newly sworn citizen. Even when
men and women rule through law, it remains nevertheless men and women
who rule, as political theorist Franz Neumann, among others, has so
persuasively demonstrated. 7 Equating realism, simple recognition of the
true political face of law, with anti-democratic or totalitarian sentiment was
a total fraud, but a shrewdly intelligent one from the perspective of those
devoted to insulation of the status quo from all criticism. No African-
American, the legendary civil rights attorney and Dean of Howard Law
School, Charles Hamilton Houston, was fond of observing, needed to be
reminded of the difference between law in the books and law in action. But
others, without such direct personal experience of the disparity between the
system's claims and its performance, could fall victim to precisely the
ideology which realism sought to derail.
If not legal certainty, stare decisis, original intent, the elaborate
rigmarole of law review footnotes and turgescent casebooks-on which little
reliance should ultimately be placed according to the realist critique-what
are the irreducible components of political freedom, the minimum structure
of constitutional democracy? The three essential elements are popular
Legal Method in the Philosophies of Hegel and Savigny, 44 TUL. L. REv. 766 (1970);
Mitchell Franklin, Dialectical Contradictions in Law, in DIALECTICAL CONTRADICTIONS:
CONTEMPORARY MARXIST DISCUSSIONS 149 (Erwin Marquit, Philip Moran, Willis H. Truitt,
eds., 1982).
17. See FRANZ NEUMANN, THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE: ESSAYS
IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1957); FRANZ NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW: POLITICAL
THEORY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN MODERN SOCIETY (1986); OTTo KIRCHEIMER & FRANZ
NEUMANN, SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND ThE RULE OF LAW (1987).
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sovereignty (and an inevitably hard won universal suffrage), civil rights and
liberties, and public government."8 The historic struggle to establish the
power of parliaments and legislatures against kings and dictators and to
secure such basic liberties against state power as the right to speak or
organize trade unions has proved essential to the construction of modem
democracy. But the guarantee of public, rather than secret, government
remains on a par with the first two components of a free society and may,
indeed, have become the most precarious of the three pillars supporting
constitutional rule in the United States. The reason, once again, arises from
historically specific political conditions.
It was, to be sure, the first two aspects of constitutional government
which Hitler and the Nazis, in the 1930s, went after with a vengeance.
Their hatred for parliamentary sovereignty was of a piece with Bismarck's
assault on the Social Democratic and liberal parties in the nineteenth
century. In the 1860s, Bismarck had advanced the notorious Luecken-
theorie, or "theory of the gap," to provide what Gordon Craig calls "a
spurious legal justification" or legal cover for defiance of the Prussian
Chamber of Deputies and, decades later, Bismarck offered a further
argument which could be used to dissolve the Reichstag: "It can very well
happen," he boasted in 1886, "that I will have to destroy what I made."' 9
The linkage between Bismarck and the fascist period is made explicit by
Fritz Fischer who observes that the rise of Social Democracy to the
"position of strongest party in the German Reichstag in January 1912 served
as an alarm signal," precipitating a demand by the big industrialists and
great landowners, the alliance of steel and rye, that "the Reichstag be
neutered and the trade unions suppressed, for it seemed to them that their
economic and social position could be guaranteed only in an authoritarian
corporate state: here the nexus with Papen's ideas of 1932, even with the
year 1933, becomes palpable. 2 °
Early in February, 1933, taking full advantage of a presidential decree
drafted by those who held power prior to Adolf Hitler and designed to
18. See IMMANUEL KANT, KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS (Hans Reiss ed. & H.B. Nisbet
trans., 2d ed. 1991); ANTHONY ARBLASTER, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF WESTERN LIBERAL-
ISM (1984); Anthony Chase, The Rule of Law and the Capitalist State: Bills of Rights in
Jeopardy, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 85 (1991).
19. GORDON CRAIG, GERMANY 1866-1945, at 174 (1978).
20. Fritz Fischer, FROM KAISERREICH TO THIRD REICH: ELEMENTS OF CONTINUITY IN
GERMAN HISTORY, 1871-1945, at 42 (1986); see SEBASTIAN HAFFNER, THE AILING EMPIRE:
GERMANY FROM BISMARCK TO HITLER (1989); HANS-ULRICH WEHLER, THE GERMAN
EMPIRE 1871-1918 (1985).
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control the Nazis themselves, Hermann Goering initiated massive censorship
of newspapers, public meetings, and radio broadcasts which "abused, or
treated with contempt," organs or leading officials of the government. At
the end of that month, the Reichstag building was burned to the ground,
probably by Heydrich's SA/SS, while "Hitler and Goering wasted no time
in laying the deed at the doorstep of the Communist party and in using this
charge to justify a crippling blow at what was left of the democratic
system."21  Hitler promised in a newspaper interview that individual
liberties would be restored once the Communist menace had been liquidated
but this was, of course, immediately followed by an assault on all enemies
of the Nazi party.22 The next step was a full-scale Gleichschaltung, putting
into the same gear the whole of society, which meant purging the adminis-
trative apparatus, incorporation of trade unions, dismantling of governmental
structures in the federal states, destruction of the Weimar political party
system, finally abolition of the Reichstag as a "genuine parliamentary
chamber, and, after July 1933, an independent speech from the floor on any
subject would have caused the very pictures to fall from the walls. 23
It is precisely these techniques, striking against civil liberties and the
elimination of parliamentary opposition (hopefully even of the legislative
body itself), which have proved so tempting and yet elusive to more recent
politicians uncomfortable with democratic institutions. Of course the desire
to provide some sort of legal justification, however strained, for official
conduct remains. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, President John Kennedy
turned to Richard Nixon, a bitter adversary, for advice as to what course of
action to follow next. "I would find a proper legal cover and I would go
in," Nixon recommended. "There are several justifications that could be
used," he continued, "like protecting American citizens living in Cuba and
defending our base at Guantanamo. The most important thing at this point
is that we do whatever is necessary to get Castro and Communism out.'"24
Thus a perceived need to provide some semblance of "legal cover" for
governmental action (however illegal the action may be) remained strong,
as did willingness to employ the standard, all purpose justification of anti-
communism, at least until recently when western rulers were denied that
excuse by an internal collapse of the Stalinist system. President Ronald
Reagan and his secret government used their commitment to saving
21. CRAIG, supra note 19, at 572, 574.
22. Id, at 575.
23. Id. at 582.
24. Richard M. Nixon, quoted in RICHARD REEVES, PRESIDENT KENNEDY: PROFILE OF
POWER 99 (1993).
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Nicaragua from communism, their support for the United States-manufac-
tured Contra army whom Reagan dubbed the moral equivalent of our
Founding Fathers, as justification for trading American arms for hostages
held by Iran (contrary to stated United States policy) and for bankrolling
and equipping Contra "freedom fighters" (contrary to United States law).25
The deployment of retroactive as well as "mental" Presidential Findings
during Iran-Contra (ultimately no more credible than outright, illegal
destruction of documents, which also occurred) carried the effort to fabricate
legal cover stories to a pathetic, perhaps tragicomic extreme. 6
But to whatever lengths contemporary politicians seem willing to go in
an effort to evade democratic accountability, abolition of the legislature
itself (at least in the United States) appears beyond their grasp. Admittedly,
Eisenhower and Kennedy transformed the national security bureaucracy into
a new and competing branch of government. Lyndon Johnson created his
own Gulf of Tonkin incident and prosecuted a savage and unpopular "police
action" in Vietnam without a Congressional declaration of war. Richard
Nixon had his enemies list, bugging devices, and successfully conspired to
run against the opposition candidate of his choice. Reagan's "can do" NSC
staffer, Lt. Colonel Oliver North, bragged of his willingness to lie to
Congress if he felt the end justified the means. But actually dissolving the
legislature seems a political gambit about which American authoritarians can
only fantasize. In the 1930s, President Franklin Roosevelt unsuccessfully
sought to pack the United States Supreme Court and in Gabriel Over The
White House, a Hollywood film made during Roosevelt's first year in office,
the President in fact suspends a deadlocked United States Congress for the
duration of the Great Depression.27 But by the end of the twentieth-
century, if riot by the 1930s themselves, such extreme alternatives as
25. Not only did anti-communism drive United States policy in Nicaragua but, as
Theodore Draper points out, United States fear of Soviet influence in Iran at least contributed
to the Reagan administration's desire to become convinced that there were anti-terrorist
"moderates" in the Iranian government who could be won over by sophisticated weapons
supplied first by Israel, then the Pentagon and CIA; see THEODORE DRAPER, A VERY THIN
LINE: THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIRS (1991).
26. Id. at 212-16. For the bottom line conclusion drawn by the Iran-Contra Independent
Counsel, see LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR
IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS, VOL. I: INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS (1993). "President
Reagan, the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, and the director of central intelligence
and their necessary assistants ... skirted the law, some of them broke the law, and almost
all of them tried to cover up the President's willful activities." Id. at 561.
27. See ANDREW BERGMAN, WE'RE IN THE MONEY: DEPRESSION AMERICA AND ITS
FILMS 110-20 (1971).
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outright redesign or elimination of a branch of government (or rescinding
of the franchise) had apparently been declared off limits by the ground rules
of the liberal capitalist state. It is for this very reason, this historical shift
in "the rules of the game," that the third component of constitutional
democracy has become absolutely crucial to the maintenance of a free
society: Public government is critical if secrecy is to be prevented from
providing the cloak by which those who seek democracy's subversion can
achieve their main aims without actually having to risk construction of a
police state or straightforward abolition of the legislature. Nixon may have
engineered the Saturday Night Massacre, George Bush may have stolen the
Presidency in 1988 through "flagrant misrepresentations" of his part in Iran-
Contra, 29 but Nixon could not abolish the courts and Bush could not avoid
an eventual confrontation with the record (and the electorate) in 1992, unless
he chose (like Lyndon Johnson) not to run again. Where contemporary
authoritarians have done their greatest damage to the democratic state is in
secret, not in public where they realize they could actually lose.3 ° What
brought down Nixon's regime was the bungled burglary of the Watergate
complex. What Reagan and his co-conspirators did not count on was
Nicaragua shooting down the Hasenfus plane. Even Rodney King's
assailants ended up being convicted of felonies for one reason-someone
had a video camera, ready and able to make public the secret brutality of the
Los Angeles Police Department. Without the videotape, the beating simply
did not happen.3 Secrecy is a final refuge within modem constitutional
democracy for the totalitarian impulse.
In spite of thousands of pages of law reviews and legal textbooks
devoted to constitutional law and its practice as well as tens of thousands of
law school classroom hours devoted to separation of powers analysis and the
28. Though not, of course, liberal capitalism's sponsorship of such "extreme alternatives"
in someone else's country; see, e.g., WILLIAM BLUM, THE CIA: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY,
U.S. GLOBAL INTERVENTIONS SINCE WORLD WAR 2 (1986).
29. Peter Kombluh & Malcolm Byrne, Iran-Contra: A Postmortem, 27 NACLA REPORT
ON THE AMERICAS 29, 33 (Nov./Dec. 1993).
30. Bill Moyers, in his excellent Iran-Contra television documentary exploring reasons
why the Reagan administration opted for secret government and against democracy, says to
key Reagan official Michael K. Deaver: "You didn't want the campaign for reelection [in
1984] to be fought out around Central America." "Absolutely. Never," replied Deaver,
"because if we'd have fought the campaign on Central America, we might have lost." Bill
Moyers, Frontline: High Crimes and Misdemeanors (Corporation for Public Broadcasting,
Nov. 27, 1990).
3 1. See JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE
EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE (1993).
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endless parsing of Supreme Court cases, only during the last two decades
has this public/secret dichotomy been thrust onto the stage of national poli-
tics in such a way as to virtually compel its introduction within the canons
of modem political theory. Thus only now can we acknowledge the
discovery of the invisible state as one of the key breakthroughs of twentieth-
century jurisprudence, poised to force a dramatic paradigm shift in legal
knowledge.32 Will this startling insight be used to transform the discipline
or, on the contrary, will it be suppressed because of the threat it poses to
normal political science, to law teaching (and law school casebooks) safely
locked within a uniformly obscurantist doctrinalism? It is against such a
resolute preservation of knowledge itself as one more guarantor of the status
quo that this special issue of the Nova Law Review is published. Along with
Judge Walsh's "sober and thoughtful" report on official United States
government involvement in Iran-Contra,33 and Jim Sheridan's Academy
Award-nominated film, In the Name of the Father (revealing an "extraordi-
nary climate of fear and censorship perpetrated by the British government
in relation to the affairs of the North of Ireland"),3 4 this issue of the Nova
Law Review constitutes one of the year's most significant contributions to
exposure of the secret state, to the developing critique of invisible govern-
ment.
Matthew Kaplan's article takes as its focus one of the most important
and yet least understood aspects of the Iran-Contra scandal: The way in
which the executive branch of government was able to give an impression
it was cooperating in the investigation at the very moment it was placing
drastic limitations on the Independent Counsel's ability to secure criminal
convictions. President Bush's notorious post-election defeat pardons,
described by special prosecutor Lawrence Walsh as the final act in the Iran-
Contra cover-up, received wide publicity and provided Christmas Day
32. See NORBERTO BOBBIO, Democracy and Invisible Power, in THE FUTURE OF
DEMOCRACY: A DEFENSE OF THE RULES OF THE GAME 79 (1987); BILL MOYERS, THE
SECRET GOVERNMENT: THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS (1990).
33. Theodore Draper, Walsh's Last Stand, 41 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS 26, 29 (March 3,
1994).
34. Michael Mansfield, Jurassic Justice, 4 SIGHT AND SOUND (n.s.) 7, 7 (March, 1994);
see GERRY CONLON, IN THE NAME OF THE FATHER (1993); Ronan Bennett, Criminal Justice,
15 LONDON REV. OF BOOKS 3 (June 24, 1993); STEPHEN DORRIL & ROBIN RAMSAY, SMEAR!
WILSON AND THE SECRET STATE (1991). For films (available on video) which similarly
attempt to cast light on Britain's secret government, see A VERY BRITISH COUP (WGBH
Educational Foundation 1992); HIDDEN AGENDA (Hemdale Film Corp. 1991); DEFENSE OF
THE REALM (Hemdale Film Corp. 1986).
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headlines across the nation." Even Democratic Congressmen have
admitted that the legislative investigation of Iran-Contra was curtailed in
order to protect Ronald Reagan and to prevent the development of evidence
which might necessitate his impeachment or damage the Presidency at a
time when Reagan administration posturing supposedly had the Soviet Union
on the ropes. Yet it is still possible that the cover-up would have collapsed
but for skillful deployment of a national security justification for limiting
evidence available to the Independent Counsel. "Though Walsh was
appointed at the initiative of the Reagan administration," observes Theodore
Draper, "his investigation was not welcomed by it or by the Bush adminis-
tration. They put various obstacles in his path, especially when it came to
getting classified documents."36 It is just this particular obstacle's legal
twists and turns which Matthew Kaplan provides careful scrutiny in his
detailed examination of the law of state secrets.
Stanley Kutler, author of the definitive historical account of the
Watergate scandal, warns us that the "Iran-Contra affair perhaps represented
a greater threat to the American constitutional order than had Water-
gate. . .""' and Theodore Draper, reflecting on Iran-Contra, adds that "[i]f
ever the constitutional democracy of the United States is overthrown, we
now have a better idea of how this is likely to be done."38 Watergate itself
seems to have lost some of its cutting edge over the past twenty years.
During the 1994 network television broadcast of the Superbowl, a cleverly
written and directed soft drink commercial presented a Woodstock-like
celebration staged in a farmer's field and featured aging rock stars (playing
themselves) commenting, more or less, on the vicissitudes of time. A small
boy watching the odd event from a hillside above informs his mates that
"this is the anniversary of a historic event." "What event?" another inquires.
"Watergate," he replies solemnly.39
But for those Americans, now aging themselves, who shared the
existential experience of living through the scandal day to day, Watergate
35. See Owen Ullmann & Mark Thompson, Bush pardons 6 in Iran-contra, MIAMI
HERALD, Dec. 25, 1992, at Al.
36. Draper, supra note 33, at 26.
37. STANLEY 1. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD
NIXON 609 (1990).
38. Theodore Draper, Foreword, in THE IRAN-CONTRA SCANDAL: THE DECLASSIFIED
HISTORY xiii, xiii (Peter Kornbluh & Malcolm Byrne eds., 1993).
39. This television spot was created to be shown during the Superbowl football game
by the advertising firm of BBDO in New York and has since been shown during the Grammy
Awards and as part of other programming. Telephone Interview with Maria Amato, Assistant
Producer, BBDO Advertising (Mar. 13, 1994).
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is likely to remain an indelible illustration of official misconduct and
lawbreaking, having constituted an appalling (and at the time, almost
unimaginable) demonstration of the capacity of those in power to govern
through lies and deceit. In a word, what Watergate had was Nixon. It has
subsequently influenced popular perception of political scandals, even helped
name them as Professor Kutler records. Though Watergate did not have an
"off-the-shelf, self-financing, stand-alone, full-service covert operation," like
Iran-Contra,4" it did have Cointelpro and the Plumbers and bagmen and the
"White House horrors," as Attorney General John Mitchell famously called
them.4 And, like Iran-Contra, it did suggest that the Constitution belonged
in the office document shredder. A retrospective collection of essays on
Watergate could not bring together a more interesting group of authors than
this one. Samuel Dash provides the most analytical and informed of
insider's views while Stanley Kutler updates the historical portrait which
previously earned him professional acclaim among Watergate aficionados.
Stephen Ambrose proposes his own intriguing answers to those annoying
Watergate questions which continue to puzzle journalists and historians (e.g.,
why did Nixon fail to burn the tapes?) and Mark Tushnet provides scholarly
reflection on Watergate's impact on separation of powers doctrine.
Steven Richman's meditation on the legal and moral dimensions of
Maxwell Anderson's 1935 verse play, Winterset, may at first seem an odd
companion piece to essays on Iran-Contra and Watergate. But as Richman
shows, Anderson's play takes its theme from the Sacco and Vanzetti case
and the issues raised by that prosecution and by Anderson's drama are as
meaningful today as ever. Curiously enough, the Sacco and Vanzetti case
(and Roscoe Pound's failure to speak out publicly about it at the time) may
have had an independent influence on Karl Lewellyn's growing commitment
to reform and his increasing dissatisfaction with efforts to idealize the status
quo.42 And that, of course, brings us back to where we began, to the
realist critique of the unwritten constitution. It is the subsequent (and
equivalently iconoclastic) discovery of invisible government, however,
which is given pride of place in this issue of the Nova Law Review, to
which the reader seeking a certain intellectual provocation as well as legal
and political critique may now confidently turn.
40. DRAPER, supra note 25, at 530.
41. KUTLER, supra note 37, at 365-66.
42. See MORTON J. HORWiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 175 (1992).
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